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State Responsibility and the War on Terror:
The Legacy of Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates
Robert F. Turner*
The first "purpose" of the United Nations set forth in Article 1(1) of its
Charter is "[tio maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace."' Article 2(4) outlaws all aggressive uses of force.2 This reflects a radical
departure from the prevailing legal regime of earlier centuries, which recognized
a sovereign state's inherent legal right to resort to force and imposed a duty of
neutrality on all states not involved in a conflict.
Today, as America faces asymmetric threats to its security often
characterized by the tactics of terrorism, there is wisdom to be found in the
writings of one of America's greatest Founding Fathers, Thomas Jefferson. He
foresaw the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states,
the utility of multilateralism and collective security arrangements, and the
importance of dealing decisively with acts of aggression or terrorism, lest they
become parents to others. A brief discussion of Jefferson's contributions in this
area is particularly relevant to the theme of the present issue of the Chicago
Journalof InternalionalLaw, as Jefferson led America in its first battles with statesponsored international terrorism.3 In so doing, he relied upon a combination of
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JD, SJD, University of Virginia School of Law. Professor Turner cofounded the Center for
National Security Law at Virginia in 1981. A former Charles H. Stockton Professor of
International Law at the US Naval War College, he has taught seminars in advanced national
security law at Virginia as well as undergraduate courses and seminars on international law
and US foreign policy in Virginia's Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and
Foreign Affairs.
United Nations Charter, art 1(1).
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." United Nations Charter, art 2(4).
The Barbary regencies would attack commercial ships on the high seas and enslave any
surviving foreigners who were not protected by treaties purchased by tribute. The brutal
nature of these actions against noncombatants was designed to instill fear in the hearts of
foreign governments and their peoples alike in order to persuade them to purchase peace
treaties with the regencies.
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regular forces (navy and marines) and unconventional/covert warfare to present
his adversaries with the choice between abandoning their predation or losing
their jobs and perhaps their lives. In the process, he showed the world that the
most promising path to peace, when confronted by terrorism, is unity and
strength, and paved the way for the restoration of freedom of the high seas.
I. SETTING THE STAGE
One of the many parallels to the modern American war against terrorism is
that Jefferson's problem was exacerbated by a long history of European
weakness4 during which payments of tribute and ransoms promoted a growth
industry of terrorism.' The Barbary regencies had preyed upon European
commerce-and were generously rewarded for having done so-for two
centuries before the United States of America arrived on the scene as an
independent actor.6 The revolutionary victory deprived America of the
protection of the British flag-like other European powers, the British were
paying tribute to secure unmolested transit on the high seas. This lack of
protection, combined with the increase in American commerce, 7 and the fact
that American merchant ships "carried not an ounce of shot"8 to defend
themselves made the new nation's commerce particularly attractive for plunder.
In October 1784, the American merchant brig Betsy was seized on the high
seas and taken with its crew of eleven to Morocco. 9 Lacking both a naval force
to protect American commerce and the ability to compel the American states to
furnish the necessary funds to provide for a navy, the Continental Congress
ultimately decided to follow the European lead and authorized $80,000 to
"negotiate peace" with Morocco to obtain the release of the prisoners. 10 Not
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The term "weakness" here refers to a lack of will rather than a lack of strength. Just over a
century ago, historian Stanley Lane-Poole wrote:
It is not too much to say that the history of the foreign relations of Algiers and
Tunis is one long indictment, not of one, but of allthe maritime Powers of
Europe, on the charge of cowardice and dishonour .... [rMhat all the maritime
Powers should have cowered and cringed as they did before the miserable
braggarts ...and should have suffered their trade to be harassed, their lives
menaced, and their honour stained by a series of insolent savages, whose entire
fleet and army could not stand for a day before any properly generalled force
of a single European Power, seems absolutely incredible, and yet it is literally
true.
Stanley Lane-Poole, The Story of theBarbary Corsairs256 (G.P. Putnam's Sons 1890).
For useful background on this issue, see id at 257-59.
Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation 310-11 (Oxford 1970).
Ray W. Irwin, The Dplomalic Relations of the United States With the Barbay Powers, 1776-1816
101 (Chapel Hill North Carolina 1931).
Lane-Poole, The Stogy of the Barbary Corsairsat 274 (cited in note 4).
See, for example, Peterson, ThomasJefferson at 310-11 (cited in note 6).
Id at 311.
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surprisingly, two weeks after the crew of the Bety was freed, cruisers from
Algiers seized two other American vessels with 21 hostages. The conditions of
imprisonment were such that, by the time peace was purchased in 1796, only 85
of the 131 American hostages that had been imprisoned in Algiers remained
alive."

As word spread across the North African coast that the Americans had
signed a treaty to pay tribute to Algiers, the other Barbary states quickly
threatened to prey upon American vessels unless they received equally generous
treatment. 12 Particularly troublesome in this regard was one Yusuf Karamanli,
Bashaw of Tripoli, who had seized power upon the death of his father in 1796.
Six years earlier, Yusuf had murdered his older brother Hasan, and he held the
family of his eldest brother Hamet-who had been out of the country at the
time of their father's death-as hostages to dissuade the rightful heir from
returning and asserting his claim to power."
The few surviving historical accounts suggest that Yusuf Karamanli bore
some of the character traits attributed to modern tyrants like Saddam Hussein.
He was reportedly "feared and hated" in Tripoli, 4 and one American diplomat
who dealt with him extensively described him as "a large, vulgar beast," "a
bully," and "a cur who can be disciplined only with the whip."' 5
One of Yusuf's first acts as Bashaw was to sign a treaty of "firm and
perpetual peace and friendship"' 6 with the United States on November 4, 1796,
which was ratified with the unanimous (23 to 0) advice and consent of the
Senate on June 7 of the following year.'7 Article 10 of this treaty specified that
'8
no "periodical tribute or farther payment is ever to be made by either party."'
Article 12 provided that in the event of a dispute neither party would resort to
arms, but that the dispute would be submitted to the Dey of Algiers for binding
resolution." Documents referenced in the treaty acknowledged a receipt for a

11
12
13

Joel S. Sorkin, The PiraticalEnsignsofMahomet, Nad Rev 50, 52 (Mar 28, 1986).
Lane-Poole, The Stogy ofthe Barbay Corsairsat 275 (cited in note 4).
For useful background on this period, see Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbagy Corsairs

14

88-89 (Houghton, Mifflin 1905); Francis Rennell Rodd, General William Eaton: The Failure of
an Idea 59 (Minton, Balch 1932).
Donald Barr Chidsey, The Wars in Barbary:Arab Pirag and the Birth ofthe United States Nay 60

15

16
17

is
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(Crown 1971).
Samuel Edwards, Barbay General-The Life of William H. Eaton 84 (Prentice-Hall 1968).
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, art I, 8 Stat 154, 154 (1797).
See Journalofthe Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of America, 1789-1805 0June
7, 1797), available online at <http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field
(DOCID+@lit(ej001383)):> (visited Apr 1, 2003).
Treaty of Peace and Friendship at art 10 (cited in note 16).
"In case of any dispute arising from the violation of any of the articles of this treaty, no
appeal shall be made to arms; nor shall war be declared on any pretext whatever. But if the
consul residing at the place where the dispute shall happen, shall not be able to settle the
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one-time payment of forty thousand Spanish dollars, assorted watches, rings,
and fancy cloth.20 Additionally, there was a "Note" in which the United States
promised that each time a new Counsul was appointed to represent the United
States in Tripoli he would bring twelve-thousand Spanish dollars and specified
quantities of artillery, anchors, pine and oak boards (wood being scarce in the
desert), and other valuable commodities. 2' This, of course, provided a strong
incentive for the Bashaw to quarrel with any American diplomat as an excuse to
declare him persona non gratis and set the stage for a successor with a new
installment of treasure.
In July 1797, John Leander Cathcart was appointed American Consul to
Tripoli and William H. Eaton became Consul at Tunis. Despite the clear
provisions of the treaty, the Bashaw expressed displeasure that other Barbary
leaders received nicer gifts and suggested that if further tribute were not
forthcoming, he would find it necessary to declare war on the Americans. The
threats intensified beginning in the summer of 1799 and continuing into 1800.
In January 1801, he again threatened to cut down the flagpole in front of the
American house (the method by which war was formally declared), and in
February he formally repudiated the "perpetual" treaty of 1896 and demanded as
an alternative to war a new treaty accompanied by $250,000 plus an annual
tribute of $50,000. Soon thereafter, Cathcart was informed by a messenger, "The
door of the palace is closed to you until you pay the Bashaw his due,,' 22 and the
Bashaw wrote personally to the American President lamenting the absence of
new gifts and stating that "if only flattering words are meant without
23
performance, every one will act as he finds convenient.,
Finally, on May 10, 1801, the Bashaw announced that he was declaring war
against America, and four days later the flagpole at the US consulate was
chopped to the ground. Washington didn't learn of the declaration of war for
more than a month, as there was no wireless radio, intercontinental telegraph, or
air transportation to relay such information. However, as the Bashaw would
soon learn, the election of 1800 was not a positive development for the future of
piracy along the Barbary coast.

20

same, an amicable reference shall be made to the mutual friend of the parties, the Dey of
Algiers, the parties hereby engaging to abide by his decision." Id at art 12.
Receipt, available online at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/barbary/bar

21

1796t.htm> (visited Apr 1, 2003).
Note, available online at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/barbary/bar

22
23

1796t.htm> (visited Apr 1, 2003).
Edwards, Barbary Generalat86 (cited in note 15).
Irwin, The DiplomaticRelations of the United States With the Barbag Powers at 97 (cited in note 7).
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II. THOMAS JEFFERSON: THE NEW SHERIFF IN TOWN

The problem of the Barbary pirates was not new to Thomas Jefferson, who
took office as the nation's third President on March 4, 1801. He had dealt with it
as George Washington's first Secretary of State (1790-1793); but even before
that, as US Minister to France (1784-1789), he had listened to shocking
accounts of the barbaric treatment of American merchant seamen enslaved in
North Africa and was frustrated that nothing could be done to help them. As
early as 1786, he had favored trying to "effect a peace" with the Barbary pirates
"through the medium of war," arguing that paying tribute was beneath the
dignity of the new nation and would contribute to disrespect by others that
might ultimately lead to war with a European power. In Jefferson's view, both
"justice and honor" favored a military response.24
While in Paris, Jefferson exchanged several letters with Secretary of State
John Jay, US Minister to Great Britain John Adams, and others on this issue. In
a December 15, 1784, letter to Jay, Adams argued that those who thought "it
would be more manly to fight them" had "more spirit than prudence. 2 i In
another letter, he reasoned that it was not "good economy" to spend "a million
26
annually to save one gift of two hundred thousand pounds.

Jefferson, too, took an economic approach, but understood there was
more involved than money. He explained:
The question is whether their peace or war will be cheapest? But it is a
question which should be addressed to our Honor as well as our Avarice?
Nor does it respect us as to these pyrates only, but as to the nations of
Europe. If we wish our commerce to be free and uninsulted, we must let
these nations see that we have an energy which at present they disbelieve.
The low opinion they entertain of our powers cannot fail to involve us soon
ina naval war.27
On several occasions Adams suggested that he might prefer Jefferson's
approach were it reasonably possible to protect American commerce by force,
but he noted that the new nation had no navy and probably also lacked the
political will to persevere in such a policy. On July 3, 1785, he wrote Jefferson:
The policy of Christendom has made cowards of all their sailors before the
standard of Mahomet. It would be heroical and glorious in us to restore
courage to ours. I doubt not we could accomplish it, if we should set about
24

25

26
27

Id at 47. See also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (July 11, 1786), reprinted in
Julian P. Boyd, Mina R. Bryan, and Fredrick Aandahl, eds, 10 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 123
(Princeton 1954).
Quoted in Allen, OurNavy and the Barbay Corsairsat 35 (cited in note 13).
Quoted in Irwin, The DiplomaticRelations of the United States With the Barbary Powers at 46 (cited
in note 7).
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Page (Aug 20, 1785), reprinted in Julian P. Boyd,
Mina R. Bryan, and Elizabeth L. Hutter, eds, 8 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 417, 419
(Princeton 1953).
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it in earnest; but the 28difficulty of bringing our people to agree upon it, has
ever discouraged me.
These debates continued into the Washington administration when
Jefferson called for a military response, 29 but Washington agreed with Adams
that it was wiser to simply follow the European practice of giving in to their
demands. As the years passed, it became increasingly clear that the problem
could not be solved by buying "perpetual" treaties of peace, as these adversaries
lacked honor and would merely respond to payoffs with increased demands.
Jefferson believed that giving presents to the Barbary powers was "money
no end to the demand of these powers, nor any
thrown away," as "there is
30
security in their promises.'
III. JEFFERSON'S LOVE FOR PEACE AND PREFERENCE FOR
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Thomas Jefferson was fundamentally a man of peace, known for his
observation that "[i]f there be one principle more deeply rooted than any other
in the mind of every American, it is, that we should have nothing to do with
conquest.,31 More than a century before the UN Charter would outlaw
international aggression, Thomas Jefferson denounced "the atrocious violations
of the rights of nations, by the interference of any one in the internal affairs of
another. ' 32 That was radical thinking in 1823.
When war with England seemed imminent near the end of Jefferson's tour
as Secretary of State, he proposed what today would be termed "economic
sanctions" as an alternative to force. In a letter to Tench Coxe, he wrote:
As to myself, I love peace, and I am anxious that we should give the world
still another useful lesson, by showing to them other modes of punishing
injuries than by war, which is as much a punishment to the punisher as to
the sufferer. I love, therefore, ... [the] proposition of cutting off all
communication with the nation which has conducted itself so atrociously.
This, you will say, may bring on war. If it does, we will meet it like men; but

28

Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (July 3, 1785), quoted in Allen, Our Navy and

29

the Barbary Corsairsat 36-37 (cited in note 13).
See, for example, Thomas Jefferson, Report [to Congressl on American Trade in the Mediterranean

30

31
32

(Dec 28, 1790), reprinted in Julian P. Boyd, Ruth W. Lester, and Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., eds,
18 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 423 (Princeton 1971).
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (June 11, 1801), reprinted in Paul
Leicester Ford, ed, 8 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 62, 63 (G.P. Putnam's Sons 1897).
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (July 28, 1791), reprinted in Julian P. Boyd
and Ruth W. Lester, eds, 20 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 686, 688 (Princeton 1982).
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Oct 24, 1823), reprinted in Andrew A.
Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, eds, 15 The Wrilings of Thomas Jefferson 477, 478 (Thomas
Jefferson Memorial Association 1903).
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it may not bring on war, and then the experiment will have been a happy
33

one.

IV.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY APPROACH

The concept of collective security and defensive alliances like NATO and
the Rio Pact are assumed by many to be products of the twentieth century; but
here, too, Jefferson was ahead of his time. In 1786, Jefferson proposed such a

treaty as a means of deterring or defeating armed aggression by the Barbary
Pirates against international commerce.34 He explained that "the object of the
convention shall be to compel the piratical States to perpetual peace, without
price"-that is to say, without paying ransom-and "to guarantee that peace to
each other."35 Jefferson proposed that each party to the treaty authorize its
minister to the court of Versailles to participate in a committee or council for
effecting the treaty, with decisions being made by majority vote. He suggested
further that the collective group first direct its joint actions against Algiers-the
strongest of the Barbary regencies-and wrote: "When Algiers shall be reduced
to peace, the other piratical States, if they refuse to discontinue their piracies,
shall become the objects of this convention either successively or together, as
' 36
shall seem best.
Although the scheme was well received in parts of Europe, it ultimately
failed, because under the Articles of Confederation the American Congress
lacked the legal power to compel the states to supply the necessary resources to
sustain such a commitment. Indeed, it was in part to rectify such shortcomings
under the Articles of Confederation that the Philadelphia Convention was
ultimately convened in 1787 to write the Constitution.
V. PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH
As "peace activists" again man the barricades around the world to protest
the actions of the United States, Great Britain, and their coalition partners to
enforce the law of the UN Charter against Iraq, it is useful to recall that Thomas
Jefferson, like so many of his contemporaries, believed that if a nation wishes to
be free and live in peace it must be able to defend itself and be willing to protect
33

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Tench Coxe (May 1, 1794), reprinted in Andrew A.
Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, eds, 9 The Wilings of Thomas Jefferson 284, 285 (Thomas
Jefferson Memorial Association 1903). Later, as President, Jefferson sought to stave off war
by persuading Congress to enact the Embargo Act of 1807.

34

See William Kirk Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Poliy 29-33

35

Thomas Jefferson, Proposalsfor Concerted Operation Among the Powers at War With the Piratical

36

States of Barbary (Nov 1786), reprinted in Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, eds,
17 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 145, 146 (Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association 1903).
Id at 147-48.

(Johns Hopkins 1927).
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its rights. The issue was not whether we preferred war or peace, but whether we
would have the option of peace in the absence of a credible ability and
willingness to defend our rights. In a 1793 letter to James Monroe, he wrote:
I believe that through all America there has been but a single sentiment on
the subject of peace and war, which was in favor of the former. The
Executive here has cherished it with equal and unanimous desire. We have
differed perhaps as to the tone of conduct exactly adapted to the securing
it.37

Like President Washington, Jefferson believed that "[t]he power of making
war often prevents it, and in our case would give efficacy to our desire of
peace." 38 He understood that war could result both from our own wrongs and
from the wrongs of other states, and emphasized to President Madison that "it
has a great effect on the opinion of our people and the world to have the moral
right on our side. ' 39 His strategy for peace while Minister to France was set forth
eloquently in a 1785 letter written to John Jay, Secretary of State for the
Continental Congress:
Justice ... on our part, will save us from those wars which would have been
produced by a contrary disposition. But how to prevent those produced by
the wrongs of other nations? By putting ourselves in a condition to punish
them. Weakness provokes insult and injury, while a condition to punish it
often prevents it. This reasoning leads to the necessity of some naval force,
that being the only weapon with which we can reach an enemy. I think it to
our interest to punish the first insult: because an insult unpunished is the
parent of many others. We are not at this moment in a condition to do it,
but we should put ourselves into it as soon as possible. 40
VI. PRESIDENT JEFFERSON AND THE BARBARY PIRATES
Jefferson's success in the election of 1800 gave him the opportunity to try
the policy of peace through strength that he had been advocating throughout his
government career. According to his own handwritten notes, his very first
cabinet meeting, on March 15, 1801, was devoted to a discussion of whether
37
38

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (June 28, 1793), reprinted in John
Catanzariti, et al, eds, 26 The Papersof ThomasJefferson 392 (Princeton 1995).
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Dec 4, 1788), reprinted in Julian P.
Boyd, William H. Gaines, Jr., and Joseph H. Harrison, Jr., eds, 14 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson

328 (Princeton 1958) This letter was mistakenly dated November 4 by Jefferson, who

39

40

corrected his error in a subsequent letter of December 5. Id at 336. See also Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (July 11, 1790), reprinted in Julian P. Boyd and Lucius
Wilmerding, Jr., eds, 17 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 25 (Princeton 1965) ("Whatever enables
us to go to war, secures our peace.").
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Apr 19, 1809), reprinted in Andrew A.
Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, eds, 12 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 273, 274 (Thomas
Jefferson Memorial Association 1903).
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay (Aug 23, 1785), reprinted in Boyd, Bryan, and
Hutter, eds, 8 The Papersof Thomas Jefferson 426, 427 (cited in note 27).
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two-thirds of the new American Navy-created by Congress during the Adams
administration-should be sent to the Mediterranean to protect US merchant
ships and perhaps more. The cabinet unanimously concurred in the desirability
of the expedition and also agreed that if, upon arrival at Gibraltar, Captain
Richard Dale learned that war had been declared against the United States, he
was to distribute his forces "so as best to protect our commerce & chastise their
insolence-by sinking, burning or destroying their ships & Vessels wherever you
shall find them."'"
Commodore Dale (he was given the honorary tide of "Commodore"
because he commanded more than one vessel at the same time) was a superb
choice to head the squadron sent to the Mediterranean, having distinguished
himself as First Lieutenant to John Paul Jones aboard the Bonhomme Richard.
Tasked with the assignment on May 20, 1801, he departed Hampton Roads on
June 1 and reached Gibraltar a month later.
Reflecting Jefferson's strong commitment to morality and enhancing the
rule of law in international relations, Dale was given strict orders to treat any
prisoners with compassion, "humanity," and "attention. ' 42 Shortly thereafter,
Cathcart was instructed by Secretary of State Madison to refrain from initiating
any negotiations so that the Bashaw would have to make the first move.
Madison thought this would discourage any43expectations of obtaining "the
smallest contribution ... as the price of peace.
Historians report that the squadron "made a good impression on the
Barbary Coast," 44 and when they appeared off Tripoli on July 24 "[t]he Pasha
was a good deal disturbed and anxious to treat for peace. ' 41 One week later, the
American schooner Enteprise, commanded by Lieutenant Andrew Sterrett, won
a decisive victory in a three-hour battle with a larger Tripolitan cruiser without a
single American casualty.46
Unfortunately, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this article,47 when
Jefferson reported on Lieutenant Sterrett's engagement in his first annual report
41

Letter from Samuel Smith to Richard Dale (May 20, 1801), reprinted in Claude A. Swanson,

42

ed, 1 Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars With the Barbay Powers 465, 467 (GPO
1939).
Allen, OurNagj and the Barbary Corsairs at 93 (cited in note 13); Rodd, General William Eaton at

43
44
45
46

73 (cited in note 13).
Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the UnitedStates With the Barbary Powers at 113 (cited in note 7).
Rodd, General William Eaton at 77 (cited in note 13).
Allen, OurNay and the Barbary Corsairs at 95 (cited in note 13).
This encounter was at the heart of Jefferson's December 8, 1801, report to Congress in his

47

first annual message, but Jefferson's portrayal of Lieutenant Sterrett's orders was both at
odds with the decision of his cabinet the previous March and clearly contrary to the actual
orders found in naval records. See Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power
Clause, 34 VaJ Intl L 903, 910-12 (1994).
For a general discussion, see id at 910-15.
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to Congress, he misrepresented the facts and gave the impression that the
absence of congressional authorization for the mission left the squadron with
only the power to fend off attacks on US ships. 48 But as this writer has
documented elsewhere,4 9 the consensus view of Jefferson's cabinet was that the
President needed no specific statutory authority to fight a war initiated or
declared by a foreign state.
Indeed, Congress does not appear to have even been formally notified of
the dispatch of two-thirds of the nation's navy into harm's way for more than six
months, although there is no evidence of any effort to keep the mission a secret
and it was widely reported in the press. Nor, for that matter, is there evidence
that Congress was unhappy about not having been asked to authorize the initial
deployment. While Congress did subsequently enact a variety of statutes
authorizing the use of force as requested by Jefferson, few members of Congress
seemed to view the confrontation as appropriate for a formal declaration of war.
The primary effect of Jefferson's misstatement to Congress has been to mislead
future generations of scholars.5 0

VII. THE "Two YEARS' SLEEP"
A very important lesson to be drawn from Jefferson's war with the Barbary
pirates is the importance of strong military leadership. After some initial
successes, Commodore Dale returned to Washington in April 1802, just prior to
the end of the enlistment period of his crew, and a new squadron-under the
command of Captain Richard Morris-was dispatched to the Mediterranean
with orders to wage war against Tripoli. Morris had all the social graces and ran a
happy ship, but he had no stomach for war in North Africa. Indeed, he didn't
even set eyes on Tripoli for more than a year, even though he had been
instructed to blockade the state.
On June 7, 1803, Morris went ashore under a white flag to talk with the
Bashaw. Yusuf demanded $250,000 plus $20,000 a year and reimbursement for
all of the costs of the war. Lacking any authority to negotiate, Morris returned to
Gibraltar where he learned that the frustrated Jefferson had relieved him of
command. A board of inquiry later found Morris guilty of gross negligence and
recommended that he be court-martialed. Rather than approving the

48

See Thomas Jefferson, FirstAnnualMessage to Congress (Dee 8, 1801), quoted in id at 910-11.

49

Id at 912-13.

50

Among the dozens of scholars who have relied upon Jefferson's first annual message to
Congress as evidence that Commodore Dale sailed to the Mediterranean with very limited
authority, see generally Rodd, General William Eaton at 80 (cited in note 13); Lane-Poole, The
Stogy of the Barbary Corsairs at 276 (cited in note 4); Forrest McDonald, The Presidency of Thomas
Jefferson 61 (Kansas 1976); Chidsey, The Wars in Barbag at 75 (cited in note 14).
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recommendation of the board, the President-who referred to the period as the
"two years' sleep"-simply fired Morris.5 '
VIII. GENERAL WILLIAM EATON

If Captain Richard Morris showed little courage or initiative, William Eaton
made up for it in spades. The forty-one year old protg6 of Timothy Pickering
(who had served as Secretary of State during the Adams administration) served
as US Consul at Tunis from 1798 until 1803. He was, to say the least, not
disposed to kowtowing to Yusuf Karamanli or any other Barbary tyrant. Indeed,
he viewed his negotiating instructions under the Adams administration as so
offensively weak that he wrote the Secretary of State and suggested that his role
might be better filled by a slave: "Iff we will have peace at such a price, recall
5' 2
me, and send a slave, accustomed to abasement, to represent the nation.
More than a century before British Army Lieutenant Thomas Edward
Lawrence ("Lawrence of Arabia") achieved legendary status promoting
revolution in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, William Eaton learned the languages and
culture of North Africa and (as Lawrence would later do) attired himself in
flowing Arab robes-inspiring those who served under him to follow him and
winning converts of those who at first dismissed him as an impractical dreamer.
One biographer reports that Eaton "spoke at least four Arab dialects without an
accent."53 First Lieutenant P.N. O'Bannon, commander of a Marine detachment
that followed "General" Eaton into war, wrote: "Wherever General Eaton leads,
54
we will follow. If he wants to march us to hell, we'll gladly go there.
When the Bashaw of Tripoli sent his army commander to inform Consul
Cathcart that the door of the palace was closed to him until the Bashaw was
given "his due," one of Eaton's biographers provides this account:
The bullying was more than William could tolerate. "Lisle," he said,
addressing the renegade Scotsman in English, "if any harm comes to Mr.
Cathcart, I give you my solemn, personal word of honor that I shall hunt
you down, put a noose around your neck and hang you from the nearest
palm tree. If I can, I shall do it with the aid of the United States Army and
Navy. If possible, I shall also enlist the services of the Royal Navy, which
has grown tired of the blustering of a traitor. But, if necessary, I shall do it
55

alone!"
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On August 1, 1802-the same day that Lt. Sterrett won his naval victoryWilliam Eaton achieved a similar success without a single ship under his
command by simply announcing in Tunis, without the slightest authority, that
Tripoli was in a state of blockade. Afraid of a run-in with American warships,
merchant ship captains simply refused to accept cargo bound for Tripoli. When
Commodore Dale learned of Eaton's initiative he strongly approved. Eaton later
wrote the Speaker of the House of Representatives in Washington: "I kept the
enemy three months in a state of blockade when we had not a ship of war within
three hundred leagues from his port; his chief commerce and whole supplies of
provisions depending on Tunis. 56
IX. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND AN ALLIANCE WITH
HIS ENEMY'S ENEMY
Eaton's greatest achievement was originally suggested by John Cathcart: an
incredible land attack against Tripoli led by Yusuf's elder brother Hamet. It
reflects an important understanding about incentive structures: If you want to
get the Bashaw of Tripoli (or, for that matter, the President of Iraq) to make
concessions (like living up to treaty commitments), success is more likely if he
perceives that he has something valuable at risk if the quarrel goes badly. One
reason deterrence failed in 1990 was that Saddam Hussein had every reason to
believe that the worst possible outcome of an invasion of Kuwait was that his
forces would be ejected and some of them would lose their lives. He had already
sacrificed close to half-a-million Iraqi soldiers in his aggression against Iran
during the previous decade, and the potential for gaining control of Kuwait's
rich oil fields (a benefit he could internalize and use to fill his personal bank
accounts) was hardly outweighed by the risk that more Iraqi soldiers would die
in the process. Particularly after Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney fired the
Air Force Chief of Staff for suggesting that Saddam might personally be a target
and emphasized that the United States would not engage in "assassination,"
Saddam had little reason to expect that he was personally at serious risk if he
continued his aggression.5"
Professor John Norton Moore, the founding Chairman of the Board of the
US Institute of Peace, whose theoretical work on the origins of war is among the
most impressive in recent years, has observed that major aggression results when
undeterred totalitarian or authoritarian tyrants perceive that war is in their self56
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interest because they can internalize benefits and externalize costs. 8 To raise the
perceived costs to the Bashaw of Tripoli in the early nineteenth century,
Cathcart and Eaton proposed that they locate his elder brother, Hamet
Karamanli, and signal Yusuf that if he did not immediately make peace and
release all American hostages he risked losing his job and perhaps his life to the
rightful heir to the throne.
Eaton first raised the idea of using Hamet to put pressure on Yusuf with
Secretary of State Madison in a letter dated September 5, 1801. In 1803, he
returned to the United States to plead his case in person. It is clear that Jefferson
and Madison approved the idea of making some use of Hamet, at least in general
terms, but they apparently sought to keep what in a more recent era would be
called "plausible deniability" and left much of the detail to Eaton's discretion.
Historians who have examined the record are divided over whether Jefferson or
Madison knew of and actually approved what ultimately occurred. While several
writers assert that the Hamet expedition was specifically approved by
Washington, Jefferson's biographer Merrill Peterson asserts that the President
"refused to endorse" Eaton's "audacious plan ... to lead a motley
insurrectionary army overland against Tripoli." 9 Historian Henry Adams may
have captured the reality in noting that Eaton's orders were "vague"6 -probably
intentionally so.61
Whatever Jefferson's intention, near the end of 1803 Eaton was appointed
Navy agent for the United States on the Barbary Coast and was promised
$40,000 to further some sort of operation involving Hamet. In furtherance of
Eaton's plan, Commodore Barron instructed Lieutenant Isaac Hull to lead a
group of marines to accompany Eaton to Alexandria, Egypt, to try to locate
58
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Hamet. Hull and his party were instructed to "disguise the true object" of their
mission, pretending to be on leave. In late February, Eaton made contact with
Hamet and offered to assist him in regaining his throne, promising a sum of
money as well to secure Hamet's cooperation. The two entered into a
"convention" that provided in part: "[T]he government of the United States
shall use their utmost exertions so far as comports with their own honor and
interest, their subsisting treaties and the acknowledged law of nations, to
reestablish the said Hamet Pasha in the possession of his sovereignty of
Tripoli."

62

While some historians have observed that this agreement exceeded Eaton's
instructions, it is difficult to interpret the actual language used as committing the
United States to do anything it did not conclude to be in its "interest." In
addition to initiating a covert operation with Hamet, to get the cooperation of
Tunis, Eaton quietly promised its chief minister a payment of $10,000 if the
operation succeeded. This idea, too, apparently originated with James Cathcart.
The dozen Americans then put together a motley band of roughly five
hundred Arab and Greek mercenaries from about a dozen countries, and in early
March 1805 set out on a five-hundred mile march across the Western Desert to
Tripoli. As they traveled, the force grew to between six hundred and seven
hundred fighting men with roughly another five hundred family members and
"camp followers" making up the rear.
Eaton's leadership skills were frequently put to the test during the arduous
trip. As food and water supplies dwindled and the heat took its toll, there were
demands for additional payments and threats of desertion. Eaton at one point
cut off rations to the Arabs to end a threatened mutiny, and when Hamet
refused to continue Eaton marched off into the desert without him--to be
joined by a frustrated Hamet two hours later. The situation worsened on April
15, when the force arrived at Bomba to find that the promised American
warships had not arrived. However, the Argus arrived early the next morning,
and the next day the Hornet brought additional food and military supplies.
On April 25 they completed the sixty-mile march from Bomba to Derne,
the second largest city in Tripoli, and learned that two-thirds of the city
inhabitants were ready to welcome Hamet as their rightful leader. Knowing that
the town was defended by a force of eight hundred and that Yusufs army was
about to arrive from Tripoli, Eaton sent a message to the governor under a flag
of truce offering terms in the hope of avoiding further bloodshed. Receiving in
reply a message saying, "My head or yours," Eaton's force commenced an
attack.63 The governor fled, and Eaton's army soon took the city. Days later,
Yusuf's army of twelve hundred arrived from Tripoli and attacked Eaton's army,
62
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but after Eaton's men demonstrated the accuracy of American cannon fire,
Yusuf's men quickly lost their stomach for war. Eaton's army was prepared to
move on Tripoli with the support of offshore US naval fire, when his entire
operation was undermined from Washington.
From the start, one of the strongest critics of Eaton's plan was Colonel
Tobias Lear, US Consul in Algiers, who believed that Hamet was simply too
weak to be a viable ally against Yusuf and that the long march across the desert
could not possibly succeed. Government leaders in Washington had no way of
following Eaton's progress in the desert and didn't know that Commodore
Edward Preble was doing a brilliant job of putting pressure on Tripoli. Indeed,
Preble's blockade was so effective that the Barbary pirates had been shut down
completely for months. But at the end of October 1803, the frigate Philadelphia
ran aground off Tripoli during strong winds and was captured by the pirates.
News of this setback was a shock to Jefferson and no doubt contributed to
the decision to authorize Lear to pursue a diplomatic solution in Tripoli. In fact,
three months after it was captured, the Philadelphiawas burned in a daring raid
led by Lieutenant (later Commodore) Stephen Decatur in which scores of pirates
were killed without a single American fatality and only one American sailor
slightly wounded. Professor Forrest McDonald notes: "Lord Admiral Horatio
Nelson, the greatest sailor of the entire era of fighting sail, called Decatur's raid
'the most bold and daring act of the age."' 64 But by the time news of Decatur's
heroic escapade reached Washington, Lear had already been authorized to seek a
negotiated peace.
On June 11, 1805, the U.S.S. Constellation arrived off Derne with a message
from Commodore Rodgers dated six days earlier informing Eaton that a peace
treaty had been signed on June 5 by Lear and Yusuf. Eaton was ordered to
withdraw all of the Christians and Hamet's immediate party immediately. The
Arab mercenaries were to be left ashore, abandoned to their fate. Historians
disagree about whether they were immediately slaughtered or allowed to return
home, but this aspect of the operation was hardly a high point of American
honor.
Even though his operation was terminated before achieving total victory,
Eaton's bold adventure had a great influence on the outcome of the war. Two
days passed between the arrival of the Hornet with authorization for Lear to
begin negotiations and Yusuf Bashaw's signing of a peace treaty aboard the
Constitution. Six months earlier, before Eaton's expedition with Yusuf's brother,
the Spanish consul in Tripoli had sent word to Lear that the United States could
probably negotiate a favorable treaty. By the time Yusuf learned of Eaton's
expedition, Yusuf was genuinely frightened and therefore even more willing to
negotiate. When Lear presented a draft peace treaty, Yusuf agreed immediately
64
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to sign it-asking only the addition of one article promising that Eaton and his
Americans would be withdrawn immediately and would no longer provide any
support to Yusuf's domestic enemies.6"
The treaty was unprecedented in the relations of Western nations with the
Barbary pirates. Even before Lear's arrival, the Bashaw had reduced his demand
from three million dollars to sixty thousand dollars as the price of peace, but
when Eaton presented him with a draft that provided for no payment for peace
and no annual tribute it was promptly accepted. The treaty provided for the
immediate exchange of all prisoners, and since the Bashaw held three hundred
Americans while the Americans held only one hundred Tripolitans, Lear did
agree to a payment of sixty thousand dollars for the difference.6 6 The treaty
further provided that, in the event of future war, prisoners would be exchanged
rather than enslaved and the party holding the most prisoners would be
compensated at a fixed rate depending upon each prisoner's rank.6" Additional
provision was made for the punishment of Tripolitan ship commanders who
subjected any American to abuse or plundered property.6 8 On April 12, 1806hours before President Jefferson's sixty-third birthday celebration-the Senate
gave its consent to ratification by a vote of 21 to 8. President Jefferson quickly
ratified the treaty.
X. THE LEGACY
In retrospect, Jefferson and Madison may have erred in undermining
Eaton's bold adventure, although any difference in the final outcome probably
would not have justified the additional loss of life that might have accompanied
an attack on Tripoli. Like the 1991 decision to end Operation Desert Storm
without pursuing the Revolutionary Guard to Baghdad and perhaps arresting
Saddam Hussein as a war criminal, the wisdom of the decision to negotiate
peace in 1805 can be debated. Several scholars have speculated that Lear could
have had a treaty without the need to pay Yusuf sixty thousand dollars to obtain
release of the three hundred American prisoners, and they are quite possibly
right. Had President Jefferson and Secretary of State Madison been in
possession of more timely and accurate information about the situation in the
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Mediterranean, and had they possessed the ability to communicate on a real-time
basis with Eaton and Lear, perhaps they would have taken a firmer stand.
Although bitter and feeling betrayed, General Eaton returned to America
as a hero and for many months was feted at receptions around the nation. The
Massachusetts legislature granted him ten thousand acres in what is now Maine,
and Congress voted to settle his account equitably and to grant a small sum as
well to Hamet. (Hamet also obtained the release of his wife and family from
Yusuf pursuant to the treaty of peace.) When Congress learned of the details of
the covert operation that contributed to the peace, the only criticism voiced was
that Hamet had been treated shabbily and that the abandonment of the Arab
mercenaries might make it more difficult to recruit such forces in the future
should that ever become desirable. It is noteworthy that no one in Congress
criticized the administration for sending two-thirds of the American Navy halfway around the world with authorization to attack foreign ships without even
formally notifying Congress.
More broadly, the courageous American venture sent shockwaves across
Europe and throughout the other Barbary states. Jefferson sent Stephen Decatur
with a squadron to demand that Algiers abandon its efforts to extract tribute
from America, and when the Bey asked for time to consider the American
demand, the request was denied. A request for at least three hours elicited from
Decatur the response: "Not a minute." The Bey thereupon accepted the
American demand-and his concession was quickly followed by the other
Barbary states. Emboldened European leaders quickly announced their own
refusal to continue paying tribute, and centuries of terror on the high seas soon
came to an end.69
So many things have changed with the passage of two centuries that any
effort to draw parallels between Jefferson's policy of peace through strength and
the modern problems of state-sponsored terrorism must be proffered with
caution. Yet, some similarities are striking. For most of the 1990s, neither the
United States nor its European allies were willing to seriously confront
international terrorists or their sponsors. Rather than taking efficacious steps to
enforce its resolutions requiring Saddam Hussein to accept the internationally
supervised destruction of his weapons of mass destruction, the UN Security
Council elected to pass resolution after resolution denouncing his behavior and
demanding compliance. When al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorists attempted to
blow up the World Trade Center in February 1993, attacked the U.S.S. Cole,
blew up buildings housing American forces, and destroyed two American
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embassies in Africa, the United States responded with strong words and little
else.
Like the Bashaw of Tripoli two centuries ago, Osama bin Laden and
Saddam Hussein know the difference between words and deeds. After each new
terrorist attack, American leaders seemed to draw a new line in the sand and
announce: "Well if you cross this line we are really going to get angry!" When
European states were persuaded to bring international terrorists to trial and
secured convictions, the prisoners too often seemed to vanish out the back door
of the prison in an apparent effort to avoid antagonizing other terrorists and
perhaps precipitating new attacks. Before September 11, 2001, terrorists who
attacked Americans had little reason to fear any serious consequences.
A new leadership team and the shock of the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon brought about a return to an American policy of peace
through strength. Decisive military action in Afghanistan has had a positive
impact both in deterring further acts of terrorism ° and in strengthening
international determination and cooperation to bring an end to terrorism.
Today's terrorists, like the pirates of yore, are widely recognized to be the
common enemies of all mankind. This is not to say that they have no
protections under international law, as even pirates are protected from murder,
torture, and other forms of inhumane treatment.
In the past quarter-century, overt state support of international terrorism
has been dramatically reduced. In the mid-1980s, Libya's Colonel Muammar
Khadaffi was actively and rather openly supporting terrorism around the globe.
In March 1986, United States warplanes attacked various targets in Tripoli and
Bengazi. At a minimum, American firmness has made Khadaffi more discrete in
his support for terrorism, and most experts seem to accept that his involvement
in terrorist activities is at least greatly reduced today. Syria, too, appears to have
reduced at least its overt support for terrorism. Iraq and Iran remain
problematic, and the behavior of the world community in the coming months
may prove decisive in determining whether either will ultimately be deterred.
One of the most dramatic differences between 2003 and Thomas
Jefferson's era is in the relative military power of the United States and its
European allies. Today, without firm American leadership there is considerable
doubt that European states have either the will or the military resources to bring
an end to terrorism and other forms of lawbreaking in the Middle East. But
additional successes under US leadership may possibly show the world that
tyranny can be defeated and state sponsored terrorism deterred.
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The great Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu taught more than twenty-five
hundred years ago, "[Tio win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is
not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of
skill." 71 Deterrence should indeed be our ultimate goal. Jefferson was correct in
observing that "an insult unpunished becomes the parent of many others," as he
was also right in favoring multilateral responses to terrorism if that is possible. 2
While the parallels are hardly perfect, there is much wisdom to be learned from
his successful campaign to bring an end to state sponsored terrorism on the high
seas two centuries ago.
XI. CONCLUSION
If there is one message to be drawn from Jefferson's success against the
Barbary pirates, however, it is probably the importance of incentive structures.
To deter a tyrant like Yusuf Karamanli or Saddam Hussein, they must be
persuaded that their own fundamental interests are at risk if they do not obey the
law. Threatening to kill some of their soldiers is not enough; a major price must
be imposed upon regime elites if they are to be deterred.
This obviously becomes more problematic when the terrorists are willing to
sacrifice their lives for their cause. But here too, if we are clever and a bit creative,
deterrence may still work. First of all, it is not at all clear that the leaders of
terrorist organizations are all that anxious to meet Allah. Osama bin Laden did
not, after all, rush out to engage American forces when they entered Afghanistan
and destroyed much of his infrastructure there. And even those fanatics who
place little value on their own lives may be deterred in most instances. We must
ask ourselves what they hope to gain by their terrorism, and make certain that
when all of the dust settles the outcome is on balance a clear defeat for their
cause. Thus, if Americans are attacked by terrorists who hope to bring about an
end to American support for Israel, part of our response might be to increase
support for Israel. Surely those involved in the planning of the September 11
attacks must have been shocked by the reality that America emerged from the
tragedy more united and more determined to combat terrorism than ever before.
They must recognize that their effort was counterproductive.
Many years ago, a story made the rounds about the great black comedian
Dick Gregory. At the height of the civil rights movement, Gregory was
performing in a club in the deep south when a man at a table near the front of
the room yelled: "Sit down, Nigger!" Gregory paused, looked at the man, and
then said: "Say that again." The man obliged, and Gregory responded with a big
smile. "Thank you, sir! You see, I have a clause in my contract with this
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establishment that provides that I get an extra fifty dollars anytime anyone uses
that word. You have just earned me an extra hundred dollars, and I can sure use
the money. Thank you!" The audience roared with laughter and applause, the
heckler was silenced, and the remainder of Gregory's performance went
smoothly. I do not honestly know if the incident ever occurred. I like to think it
did, and if it did, it was a truly brilliant exercise of political warfare through
intellectual jujitsu. And America needs exactly that kind of creative excellence in
its current battle against terrorism.
We cannot bulletproof our society, and while there is much we can do to
make their task more difficult it is extremely unlikely that we will be able to
prevent determined terrorists from killing more Americans. Much has been
done, and more is being done, to reduce the risks of terrorism. The chances of
an American commercial airliner being hijacked in the near future are in my view
slim. Our ports, tunnels, and bridges are more vulnerable. But as we seek to
improve control of our borders and security at obvious points of vulnerability,
we ought to also be sending out a clear message to terrorists who wish us harm.
We cannot prevent you from killing some of us, but we can make sure that when
the dust settles the cause for which you are fighting will suffer far more greatly
than we do. If we can credibly communicate that message to our adversaries,
and remain united at home, we ought to be able to effectively deter most acts of
terrorism.
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